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Abstract—Developing secure software is still a software 
engineering challenge because of the complexity of software 
security. Yet integrating security engineering and software 
engineering is increasingly important, especially for service-
oriented applications, as they are exposed to new security 
challenges due to their open nature. Current security 
engineering approaches do not consider existing security 
architectures, leading to redundant development of security 
artifacts. Further, present security architecture approaches do 
not provide relevant information to a security engineering 
process. Using a service-oriented and security architecture-
centric approach for security engineering supports the 
development of secure service-oriented applications, as existing 
security solutions can be reused. In this paper a model for 
service-oriented security architectures is presented, which 
provides apt information to different consumers, such as 
security engineering processes and business services, in the 
form of views to assist the consumers security goals. The 
architecture model is exemplified by specifying different views 
of a web service-based security architecture. 
Keywords-security architecture; security engineering; 
service-orientation; web service, security services. I.  INTRODUCTION 
Software engineering is focused on developing required 
functionality [1], but with increasing software support for 
business-critical processes, the importance of software 
security grows, in order to prevent financial loss, damage of 
reputation or data leakage [2]. Security engineering, i.e., the 
engineering of software which functions correctly under 
malicious attacks [1][3], requires the incorporation of 
security into all development process phases [4]. Yet the 
intrinsic specifics of security knowledge and the huge 
amount of complex security standards prevent such 
integration, leading to post-hoc consideration of security 
measures [5][6]. 
Due to the increasing use of networked software services, 
the focus of security engineering has shifted from software 
security to application security, i.e., using security products 
to secure already existing applications, components and 
services [7]. The paradigm of service-oriented architectures 
(SOA) established itself as the main architectural concept for 
today’s enterprise information systems, as it allows 
traditional software systems to be restructured as reusable 
software services [8][9][10][11]. These software systems are 
now exposed to a vast quantity of new threats and attacks they were not designed for and need to be protected by 
external security services [7]. 
Traditional security engineering approaches focus on 
eliciting and specifying security requirements and choosing 
appropriate security measures in order to secure single 
software systems. Current security engineering approaches 
for secure SOA applications tend to duplicate these 
procedures in order to provide security measures for single 
services. They thereby ignore existing security infra-
structures, in which enterprises have invested large sums of 
money in to protect their existing software assets and which 
should be reused and restructured to security services 
according to the SOA paradigm. Additionally, existing 
security infrastructures provide constraints for security 
measures, which can be reused in a security engineering 
approach. On the other hand side, approaches for structuring 
the security infrastructure of an enterprise into a service-
oriented security architectures do not consider this 
engineering view, instead they focus on the internal 
architecture and provided services without taking security 
requirements of service-oriented applications into account. 
The contribution of this paper is the specification of a 
service-oriented security architecture model incorporating 
different interrelated views for security engineering, security 
infrastructure integration and security services in order to 
support the development and operation of secure service-
oriented applications. The security engineering view 
provides development-time information artifacts, such as 
predefined security policy models and architectural 
constraints, as well as technology guidelines in order to 
support the development of secure service-oriented 
applications. The integration view specifies how existing 
security components and applications are restructured as 
security services. The service view specifies how application 
services can delegate their security requirements to the 
security services. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 
2, related approaches of security engineering and security 
architecture are discussed. In Section 3, our service-oriented 
security architecture model is presented and each view is 
discussed. Section 4 contains the specification of a concrete 
security architecture based on web service technology using 
our abstract specification, which was developed for a 
service-oriented navigation system. A conclusion and an 
outlook on future research directions conclude the body of 
this paper. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. Security Engineering 
Software security knowledge reaches from secure code to 
enterprise wide security products such as firewalls. Each of 
these areas includes specific terms, standards and 
technologies that most developers are not familiar with. In 
order to support the development of secure software, security 
engineering intends to provide principles, methodologies, 
and tools for designing, developing, operating, and 
maintaining secure software systems [1]. 
Our research revealed only a few approaches for the 
methodical development of secure software. In [12][13], a 
general purpose security development process for traditional 
software is described using security patterns [15][16]. In 
[14], security problem frames, an adapted version of problem 
frames [17], are used to specify security requirements and to 
derive security components. Security engineering approaches 
for the development of SOA applications can be found in 
[18] and [6], which are motivated by the complexity of 
current web service security standards. Reference [18] uses 
patterns and model-driven software development techniques 
to automatically generate security standards artifacts. In [6] a 
process solely for the development of secure web service-
based systems is presented. All of the approaches tend to 
generated new security measures and fail to map these to 
existing security infrastructures and services, which is a 
general requirement for SOA applications. 
As the development of secure software needs to be 
embedded into a development method for software 
functionality, a larger amount of approaches focus on 
particular phases of security engineering processes. Misuse 
cases [19][20] and misuse activities [21][22] have been used 
to describe hostile intentions, attacks, and unwanted behavior 
in order to elicit security requirements. [23] uses extended 
problem frames to provide a formal specification of security 
requirements. Security patterns [15][16] are used to design 
security measures using best practice solutions. Each of these 
approaches supports a security engineering process, yet we 
have found no work, which shows their combined usage. It 
can also be argued, that these approaches are hard to adapt to 
the development of secure SOA applications, as it differs 
from the development of traditional software. Additionally, 
using each of these approaches leads to an increased 
complexity for developing secure measures, which matches 
the main development of the applications functionality. 
In order to simplify the specifics of security, an increased 
interest in reusable security development artifacts can be 
registered in literature, such as reusable misuse cases, 
security requirements [24] and security patterns [15][16]. Yet 
developers still need to be supported in choosing appropriate 
items from a catalog of reusable security artifacts. A service-
oriented approach can be helpful by providing a common set 
of reusable security artifacts to a development process, 
which are based on the currently used security measures 
implemented in a service-oriented security architecture, 
containing all information of previously developed secure 
SOA applications and services. B. Service-Oriented Security Architectures 
As there are several approaches for security architectures, 
we concentrated on the approaches for service-oriented 
security architectures in our literature review. In [25] the 
authors describe an event-driven reference architecture for 
three types of security services namely authentication, access 
control and identity management service, which 
communicate through the dispatching of security events. 
Similar service types are presented in [26], but the authors 
distinguish a service interface layer, providing security 
services to business-related services and layers of logical 
components implementing the security service 
functionalities. The logic components can be replaced by an 
existing security product as the authors show in [27]. The 
authors of [28] specify a technical security architecture for 
securing message exchange in business. 
As each of these approaches focuses on different security 
measures, i.e., access control and message security, they 
never provide a complete picture of a security architecture. 
In neither of the approaches the application requirements, 
which lead to the specific structure of the architecture, are 
mentioned. As the services provided by a security 
architecture are determined by applications’ security 
requirements, the presented architectures exhibit only very 
generic structures and need to be adapted to concrete security 
requirements. 
The service-oriented integration of security products [29] 
is only directly considered in the approach of [26][27]. Their 
service access points only provide security services to 
service consumers, leaving the service implementation open. 
Using the service interfaces and event-driven approach for 
communication between the security services in [25] makes 
an integration not feasible as the efficient internal comm-
unication paths of security products are interrupted. 
According to the SOA paradigm, services should provide 
their functionality through open and standardized interfaces 
in order to be reusable by different service consumers. Most 
of the aforementioned approaches rely on web service 
technology and related standards for service interface 
description. They thereby mix a technology-oriented view 
with the abstract description of their reference architectures, 
making it hard to adapt their approaches to other technology 
platforms. They also do not provide specific guidelines or 
conventions on how to apply the used standards, which 
would support the usage of the complex and flexible web 
service standards and related security standards. 
Each approach has its advantages but neither alone 
provides enough support for software developers to handle 
software security complexity. So far, security engineering 
processes neglect existing and implemented security 
solutions, leading to the development of redundant security 
measures. Security architectures do not provide their intrinsic 
knowledge about implemented security solutions to security 
engineering processes. By providing such knowledge, 
software developers are supported in their task of choosing 
and implementing appropriate security measures. 
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Figure 1.  Service-oriented security architecture view model III. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE VIEWS 
In this section, a model for service-oriented security 
architecture specifications is introduced, which is arranged in 
views. Each view provides details about the security 
architecture and is tailored for a specific purpose, as it 
contains apt information for this purpose. We classify three 
views i) a security engineering view, which provides security 
information and supporting development artifacts for a 
software engineering process, ii) a service view, containing 
information about provided security functionality and usage 
protocols using the service-oriented paradigm as well as iii) 
an integration view, which specifies the details of integrating 
existing security products. A. Security Engineering View 
From a security engineering view, a security architecture 
provides relevant information to a service-oriented develop-
ment process. The focus thereby lies upon service analysis 
and discovery as well as service design. Implementation and 
deployment phases become mostly obsolete, as existing and 
operated services are used to provide required functionality. 
Typically only specialized adapter components mapping 
proprietary interfaces of existing applications to service 
interfaces need to be developed [27]. In such cases, 
guidelines can be issued on how security standards are to be 
used to be compatible with the existing security architecture. 
The goal of security analysis is to specify the security 
requirements of an application. An existing security 
architecture implements security requirements of previous 
service-oriented applications. Therefore information about 
previously identified threats, their corresponding attacks as 
well as the associated security requirements, implemented to 
mitigate or prevent the attacks, need to be documented and 
cataloged. In doing so, developers are supported in analyzing 
the security requirements of new applications. It would also 
complement approaches for catalogs of reusable security 
requirements including possible attacks and threats [24]. 
During a design phase, security requirements are mapped 
to appropriate security design. By security design we mean static software structures such as security components and 
services as well as their dynamic interactions, which are 
added to the functional application design. A common 
approach for describing security design is through the use of 
security patterns, describing best practice solutions to 
reoccurring security problems. A security architecture should 
abstract from the implemented security measures, specify 
them using security patterns and set them into relation to 
previous security requirements, while keeping the 
implementation hidden to security service consumers. 
Instead of directly attaching a security pattern to the 
application design, the patterns should be specified 
separately as part of the security architecture. Semantic 
annotations can be used to denote the location in the 
application design, at which security measures are to be 
adhered. This separates the security design from the 
application design, according to the separation of concerns 
paradigm. It also allows the security pattern specification to 
develop independently from the application design and for 
better reuse of the security design in different application 
designs. 
Security policies play an important part in a security 
architecture, as they control the behavior of security 
components and services [25] and are thus a prime candidate 
for reuse. An example for security policies are access control 
policies of which several variations models for specific 
problems exists [30][31][32]. The security requirements of 
an application determine the kind of security policies the 
security architecture has to support. But reusing existing 
policy models of a security architecture, aides developers by 
providing a fixed and manageable set of policy models from 
which an appropriate model can be chosen from. 
A security architecture might need to support multiple 
policy models, depending on different security requirements 
of different applications. For example, some applications 
might use a role-based access control policy [30], while 
others require a more fine-grained access control policy 
using attribute-based access control [32]. 
Predefined policies represent the standard security level 
of an organization, e.g., an enterprise wide constraint on 
integrity and confidentiality levels of message exchanged 
between application services. Issuing such policies, relieves 
developers from choosing an appropriate security policies 
and makes sure new application comply with the standard 
security level. B. Security Service View 
The security services view is concerned with the 
provided security services of a security architecture. It acts as 
a mediator between the abstract security engineering view 
and the low lever integration view. The abstract security 
patterns of the security engineering view are mapped to a 
specific set of security standards and technologies. 
While a security architecture aims to centralize most of 
the security related functionality, there are security-oriented 
components which are hard to separate from the functional 
applications. A typical examples are policy enforcement 
points (PEP), which realize the result of policy decision 
points (PDP) at a resource [15]. The service view needs to 
specify how such integration of security-related components 
and application-oriented services and components is 
performed. This is usually done using specific interactions 
protocols, which can be modeled using sequence diagrams of 
the Unified Modeling Language (UML, [33]). 
A service-oriented economy requires interoperability of 
security services to exchange security information between 
business partners [34][35]. The usage of XML-based 
standards such as Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML), eXtensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML), WS-Security [36][37][38] is a good choice for 
interoperability with external partner but might have a 
negative effect on performance when used internally. The 
security services view therefore needs to provide 
specifications of the available security services, the use of 
related standards as well as proprietary standards or 
technologies both for internal use as well as for external use. 
Additionally the specific use of open standards needs to be 
documented, as they usually provide a large degree of 
flexibility. C. Security Integration View 
Concerning the integration view, the restructuring of 
existing proprietary security products to security services, by 
centralizing security components of existing applications is 
focused [26]. The other views build upon existing security 
products, as only their functionality can be provided as 
services and need to be abstracted from, in order to be used 
by other views. Due to its technical nature, this view is 
targeted at an organization’s security experts. 
We have shown how existing security functionality is 
integrated into a service-oriented security architecture by 
implementing web service adapters for a proprietary security 
product in [27]. Additionally we showed how standardized 
security policies are mapped to proprietary security product 
policies automatically. Due to place restrictions, we therefore 
will not focus on this view and refer to our previous work. IV. A SERVICE-ORIENTED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
BASED ON WEB SERVICES 
Based on the service-oriented security architecture view 
model, a concrete security architecture based on web service 
technology is described in this section. Due to place 
restrictions, we will concentrate on the access control 
functionality as well as on the security engineering and the 
service view, as we discussed the integration of security 
products in previous work [27]. We assume an existing 
security product, which provides access control evaluation 
functionality and which as been adapted to web service 
technology, if no such interface was provided by the security 
product itself. 
Note also that we do not intend to describe a complete 
development process for secure service-oriented 
applications. Instead, we are focusing on single development 
artifacts that can be provided by examining and describing 
the security architecture according to the different views as 
described in the previous section. A. Security Engineering Artifacts for Access Control 
The security engineering view remains independent from 
concrete technologies and abstracts from the web service 
implementation of the security architecture, similar to the 
development process of the application services. 
Service-oriented application development employs use 
cases to describe application services and detail their 
dynamics using process description languages such as the 
Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN, [39]) [41]. 
The security architecture provides information about 
previously analyzed attacks and threats as well as the 
formulation of access control security requirements. 
Currently, misuse cases [19][20] and misuse activities 
[21][22] are used for this purpose, as they are regarded as 
initial step in determining security requirements [40]. 
A misuse case “Unauthorized Access” describes the 
intentions of an external attacker in accessing a resource, 
e.g., a service, which he is not allowed to access. The misuse 
case is stated more precisely through the definition of misuse 
activities, interacting with the business process of the service 
(Fig. 2(a)). The access control security requirement 
associated with the “Unauthorized Access” misuse case is 
expressed as an UML collaboration diagram (Fig. 2(b)) and 
can be instantiated using service candidates, which specify 
the parts of the process to be IT-supported. 
The service candidates are the base for the development 
of the service design, i.e., provided service interfaces 
implemented by service components. Access control 
measures for services are provided using an access control 
service (ACS) and enforcement components, following the 
policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy decision point 
(PDP) pattern [15][16], to be reused in service design (Fig. 
2(c)). The PEP’s task is to query the PDP for access control 
decisions, which the latter calculates based on existing 
access control policies, and enforce the decision. 
The access control policies used by the security 
architecture are based on the role-based access control 
(RBAC) model defined in [30] due to previous requirements 
(Fig. 2(d)). Developers are offered a common approach for 
specifying access control policies as well as previously 
defined roles and their associated entitlements, which can be 
reused in the development of new applications. B. Access Control Service Specification 
Security standards related to web services technology are 
used to describe the provided access control services. 
Building upon the service interface specification for the ACS 
provided in the security engineering view, following artifacts 
are provided: a web service interface for the access control 
service (WS-ACS) using the Web Service Description 
Markup Language (WSDL, [42]), an access control policy 
model using XACML [37] including policy specification 
guidelines, a query and response protocol for access control 
decisions using SAML [36]. 
As we have chosen to provide a RBAC model for SOA 
applications, we are using the RBAC profile for XACML 
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Figure 1.  Views on an access control web service specification While XACML provides access control decision query 
statements and response statements, it depends on supporting 
standards to implement a protocol and transport mechanism 
for them. For this purpose, SAML was chosen as a 
complement standard [44]. The data flow model of XACML 
is based on the PEP/PDP pattern discussed earlier. The PEP 
is implemented using the Secure Service Agent (SSA) 
pattern [45], which specifies a lightweight component for 
enforcing access control decisions on web services. The 
message interception is performed by the SSA by hooking 
into a web service frameworks’ message processing queue. 
The WS-ACS provides a WSDL interface containing a 
operation “verifyAuthorization”, accepting an XACML 
Authorization Decision Query (XADQ, [44]) message and 
returns a SAML statement (XACML Authorization Decision 
Statement, XADS, [44]) containing the result of the policy 
evaluation (Fig. 2 (e)). 
On service invocation interception, the SSA sends an 
access control decision request to the WS-ACS using an 
XADQ request. The request includes the subject, which 
performs the access, the object, which is to be accessed as 
well as other contextual information needed to perform 
policy evaluation. On a positive outcome of the evaluation, 
the SSA allows the initial service invocation, while on a 
negative outcome the service access is prevented (Fig. 2 (f)). V. CASE STUDY: DEVELOPING A SECURE CAMPUS 
NAVIGATION SYSTEM 
We used our approach in the development of a secure 
service-oriented geographical information application for 
usage at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. A. Case Study Scenario Description 
The goal of the application is to support university 
students and lectures as well as employees and guests in quickly finding and navigating to certain places or people on 
the campus. A basic functionality of the campus navigation 
application is to allow users to search for events, persons, 
rooms and buildings and to display them on a campus map as 
well as offering a routing service to the destination location. 
The services needed for the implementation of the 
application are provided by different university organization 
units and are combined in order to create the application. 
Examples for provided services are a campus and building 
map service provided by the facility management unit, a staff 
information service provided by the human resources unit, 
which provides information about university employees and 
their corresponding location on the campus side, and event 
management services provided by different organization 
units, which provide information about upcoming events 
such as lectures, practical courses, conferences, etc. on the 
campus. B. Approach to Specifying the Security Architecture 
As the real-world scenario of the complete university 
security infrastructure is to complex to be explained in this 
paper, we will describe the development of the application 
prototype using the example security architecture described 
in the previous section. This conforms to the environment 
used for development and testing the application. We will 
also stick to the constraint of only discussing the access 
control aspect of the application. 
In order to apply our approach, we first specified a 
security architecture for the application prototype by 
choosing existing security products, implementing the core 
security functionality. As a promising candidate for access 
control and authentication functionality we chose the open 
source “Identity Server” (IdS) product from WSO2, as it 
provided support for most of the relevant web service 
security standards. 
As no previous knowledge for the product was available, 
the product’s documentation was used to provide an abstract 
specification as required by our view model. The provided 
functionality, architecture and services were abstracted by 
matching architecture and security patterns already existent 
in literature. This process was mostly performed manually 
and often required deep product knowledge. In the real-
world scenario the step was much easier to accomplish, as 
the required knowledge for the used product was provided by 
the security experts of the university. 
As the IdS supported many security standards required 
for access control for web services the relevant security 
standards were used to describe the security service view. 
Additionally, due to this, it was not necessary to explicitly 
describe the security integration view. 
We then proceeded to examine the existing literature for 
already described misuse cases, security patterns, etc. to 
specify the security engineering view of the architecture. We 
used a variant of the description of authorization misuse 
cases as provided by [19][20] as well as misuse activities for 
unauthorized access described in [21][22] to better match 
with the underlying IdS product. The IdS further implements 
a variant of the PEP/PDP access control pattern, using a 
central server as the PDP service component and an 
authorization module as a PEP component, which is placed 
in a service bus messaging and communication platform, 
utilized by the different web services. The choice for role-
based access control was also determined by the security 
product and resembles the actual policy model used in the 
real-world scenario. The resulting description of the security 
architecture resembles the specification given in section IV. REFERENCES 
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